RNZAF/USAF F4 Phantom Exchange Posting 1979-1982 – Sqn Ldr Jim Barclay RNZAF

• Ground Attack (GA) – The GA phase involved learning weapons delivery at a scored range from the following profiles:- 10 deg (dive angle) strafe normally using 100 x 20mm bullets from the very accurate Gatling six-barrelled Vulcan canon (it was fitted into the nose of the F4E, but came in a wing-mounted gun pod in the F4D), 10 deg Low Angle Bomb (LAB), 20 deg ‘Dive Toss’ (using the F4 radar to lock onto a ground return and give slant range to the target), 20 deg Low Angle Low Drag (LALD), 20 deg curvilinear, 30 deg Dive Bomb and Dive Toss, 45 deg Dive Bomb and Dive Toss.
• Night Flying (NF) – the NF phase was of one or two night TR and close formation sorties that were done before the night AR and GAN phases (see below).
• Ground Attack Night (GAN) – the GAN phase included 20 deg LALD, 30 deg Dive Bombing and Dive Toss on the scored weapons range against a lit target, or under a C130 dropped parachute flare.
• Ground Attack Tactical (GAT) – the GAT phase brought together all the skills learned in earlier phases in order to carry out attacks against targets on the Tactical Air Weapons range. New skills introduced included low level target ingress from an Initial Point (IP) at 540K/ 300 feet and a ‘pop up’ to deliver bombs or gun passes on a tactical ‘airfield’. Realistic targets included parked aircraft, petrol and oil (POL) stores, SA2 and SA3 missile sites, 57 mm gun sites, airfield control buildings and bunkers. As the Phase progressed the complexity of attacks increased from initial single aircraft attacks through to more complex pairs and 4 ship attacks. Electronic threats were introduced from ground emitters such that the F4 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) activated and pilots were required to recognize the threat and deploy chaff and flares. Jinking after weapons release and low level egress from the target area at 620K/300ft were practiced.
• Red Banner exercise – This was the final graded end-of-course sortie for each pilot/WSO wherein they were required to plan, co-ordinate and execute a totally ‘com-out’ multi-aircraft attack on a Tactical weapons range with added random attacks by ‘enemy’ fighters.
• Hot Pit refuelling – from time to time aircrew and ground crew were required to exercise the procedures to refuel the F4 with fuel pumped from a fuel supply at a designated refuelling area (the Hot Pit) with one F4 engine running. After being refuelled the aircraft returned to shutdown at dispersal on the flight line. This practiced procedures that could be found under operational conditions where fuel tankers may not have been available.

The Sortie Goal System – Each course, be it a ‘B’ Course or ‘T’ course, worked to a pre-determined course finish date, and just like a sausage machine, the course had better be finished on time because the next one was coming along right behind. The finish date was determined by the total number of sorties required to complete all phases of that course, multiplied by the number of students, plus a small ‘slippage’ factor. When the total number of sorties was broken down it gave a ‘goal’ being the number of sorties required to be flown each day to make the finish date. Each of the four F4 squadrons worked to their daily/weekly/monthly sortie goals and the 31 TFW aggregated these figures for all four squadrons to show the Wing’s monthly goal. If the monthly Wing goal was achieved by one of more days ahead of the plan, then the whole Wing got the first Friday off work (called ‘stand down’) in the following month. The sortie goal system was a powerful incentive for the whole Wing to pull together and work as one to achieve the goal so they would all get a day of stand down. Daily sortie goal progress was displayed for all to see on a big notice board just inside the main entry gate to the Base, and on that board each squadron’s sorties were displayed as a ‘+’ or ‘–‘ figure against its own goal, as well as the aggregated total that showed the Wing’s progress.

Accountability – The CC of 31 TFW (the Wing Commander) held a ‘Stand-up’ (as the CC came into the room, of course!) briefing session at 4.00 pm each day. ‘Stand-up’ was attended by the Wing DO and the CCs of each of the four F4 squadrons (or his senior rep), plus CCs of each of the key and important functions on the Base, including the big Maintenance and Supply Wings. Each flying squadron tabled an Over Head Projector slide (OHP – pre computers!) to show the sorties achieved-versus-planned for the previous day. The principle “if you measure it, you can manage it” applied, and so sorties not flown (deleted) specified a reason for the ‘delete’. When each OHP was shown in turn on the big screen the ‘fur started to fly’ as claims and counter-claims were voiced as to the actual reason for any one ‘delete’; it seemed to be a process of trying to ‘make it someone else’s problem, and so shift the heat’! The most common reasons for a ‘delete’ were as follows:-

• an ‘Ops delete’ – reasons included a pilot/WSO who became unfit to fly and a substitute was not available in time, or a take-off was outside the 15 minutes the very extensive daily flying plan specified due some Ops/Air Traffic etc reason, but there weren’t ever many Ops deletes.
• a ‘Maintenance delete’ – reasons included an aircraft not being available in time to make the scheduled takeoff window due to things like slow or no refuelling/weapons loading/broken part etc – and the maintenance guys were always looking for ways to push their ‘delete’ onto others including the Supply guys for not having a replacement part, or not supplying it in time.
• a ‘Supply delete’ – this was invariably due to not having the required spare parts in time. Raiding parts off another downed aircraft was frowned upon as it doubled the workload.

It goes without saying that one needed to do their homework well before getting to ‘Standup’ as answers to the CC’s questions from those in the ‘hot-seat’ were required on the spot. Accountability mattered a great deal and if repeated weaknesses were shown up by performance measurement, an officer would quickly be replaced. Courses needed to graduate on time so the decisions and the outcome of ‘Standup’ rippled down through the chain of command in order to constantly sharpen individual and unit performance. All of this process was based on years of experience including relatively recent USAF combat experience in Vietnam. It was a good system and it worked.     

Some brief observations on the F4 Phantom II are as follows:

• The F4 Phantom II – Wikipedia tells us “The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II was a tandem two-seat, twin-engine, all-weather, long-range supersonic jet interceptor and fighter-bomber originally developed for the United States Navy by McDonnell Aircraft. It first entered service in 1960 with the US Navy and entered service with the USAF in the mid-1960s.” The USAF F4s saw extensive service in the Vietnam War. The F4 was known by many names including “Double Ugly”, and, “The Rhino”. It was a mean looking aircraft with its tilted-down anhedral stabilators on the tailplane, and cranked up dihedral wing tips. As a fighter it was big, wide, old, very versatile, and the engines were smokey – but it was a man’s aeroplane! It had two General Electric J79-GE-17 engines of 11,990 lbs static thrust for each engine in ‘Military’ power, and 17,800lb each in after-burner.

• With its crew of two, the F4 had three main roles:- as an air-to-air Interceptor, a ground attack ‘mud-beater’, and to deliver Tactical Nuclear bombs. In comparison with other role-specialist aircraft the F4 seemed perhaps to be a “Jack-of-all-trades, but master of none”. While the F4 was good when used in any one of its three major roles, it seemed there were other specialists that could do one role better – but not them all as the F4 could do. By the time I flew the F4 in 1979-1982, its technology was considered to be dated, or old. It needed two crew members, one to fly the jet, and the other to work the radar and systems, whereas in the new single pilot F15 Eagle air superiority fighter the radar was semi-automatic in search, tracking of targets, acquisition etc.  Having said that, the multi-role F15 Strike Eagle, with two crew members, would come later!

• Speed – The maximum speed for the F4 was 750 Knots at low level and at high level it was 710K/Mach 1.9 at 30,000ft, or 710K/3 at 43,000 feet. Even while carrying two 370 gal drop tanks, M1.6 was easily attained in the operating areas out over the sea to the east of the Florida Keys. The normal speed we used at Low Level was 420K (7nm/minute], and we pushed it up to 540k [9nm/min] for a run-in to a Pop-Up weapons delivery. In the days before moving map displays, pilots liked to work in round numbers of miles/minute as it made it quicker and easier to mark off a hand-held trimmed and sectioned map at one-minute elapsed time intervals from a datum point to the next low level navigation turning point, or to the IP or target. The F4D was said to be a little faster than the F4E, but who wants to split hairs at Mach 1.4!  

• Weight and Fuel – The empty F4 Operating Weight was about 32,000lb. At HAFB, the F4 was normally operated with two x 370 gallon drop tanks that were carried under the wings giving 4500lb of JP4 fuel. The total internal fuel carried in the aircraft was 13,000lb – there were 7 internal fuel bags along the top of the fuselage (6 in the F4D) [these 7 were needed to keep the C o G and C of P within limits when the aircraft went transonic], as well as more internal fuel inside the wings. So, the All Up Weight (AUW) on a normal training sortie was 32,000lb + 13,000lb internal fuel, + 4500lb in the drop tanks = AUW 49,500lb at T/O. The maximum fuel able to be carried was 21,600lb, made up of Internal fuel of 13,000lb + 2x370gal wing tanks at 4500lb, and one 1x 600gal centreline drop tank at 4,100lb. The two Fuel Flow Gauges in the cockpit were marked up to 12,000lb/hr maximum – but fuel flow was FOUR times that amount that in After Burner, so burner was used very sparingly!
• Max T/O/Landing Weight – The maximum F4 take-off weight was around 58,000lb (the RNZAF Canberras were about 63,000lb MAUW, and the RNZAF A4K Skyhawk was 24,500lb); and the maximum landing weight for the F4 was 46,000lb.
• Takeoff using the normal full After Burner – the nose wheel lift-off speed on takeoff was about 146K, and takeoff speed about 170K, with a ground run in light winds of about 2500ft
• F4D ‘blown’ Flaps – The F4D was fitted with Leading Edge flaps, as well as trailing edge flaps. In the approach and landing configuration, with landing gear down and the leading edge and trailing edge flaps out and down, the F4D had an over-wing ‘blown’ airflow boundary layer control system that directed high pressure airflow over the flaps. This permitted improved low speed handling of the aircraft.

• F4E Leading Edge Slats (LES) – Instead of having leading edge ‘blown’ flaps as on the F4D, the F4E was fitted with Leading Edge Slats (LES). For takeoff and landing the LES operated in conjunction with the trailing edge flap switch so the slats were out; for inflight manoeuvring, with the landing gear up, the slats extended automatically as a function of AoA, being fully out at 11.5 units AoA, and back in at by 10.5 units as AoA reduced. With its LES, the F4E could turn better than the F4D, but you had to be careful as the better turning capability of the F4E could lead the novice or unsuspecting pilot to try and turn tightly in a dogfight against a more agile adversary, and with the big delta wing on the F4, airspeed would bleed quite quickly. The F4 wouldn’t fly much at or below 250 knots so it became ‘dead meat’ to an adversary.  The message a good IP always drummed-in was “Speed is life. Remember to employ the principles of Kinetic energy:- convert your speed to height and height to speed to make slashing weapons attacks, but don’t sacrifice speed by getting into a turning fight. In the F4, keep the fight big.”

• AoA Aural Tone system and F4D Pedal Shaker – The F4 had an AoA aural tone system (and a stick and pedal shaker in the F4D) – which was something very new to me in flying with a tone in my ears!  The tone ‘beeped’ as the aircraft approached Optimum AoA, and it gave a steady tone at and around Optimum AoA. The frequency of the beep increased as Optimum was exceeded. When you got used to using it, the steady ‘on-speed’ tone indicating you were at optimum AoA was great for use in air combat. The Aural Tone system was great! And the F4D’s stick & pedal shaker was very useful in avoiding an imminent high AoA ‘departure’ from controlled flight, and the possibility of entering the dreaded flat spin.
• Approach and Landing – with gear & flaps down, LES in or out [on the F4E], ‘on-speed’ or at optimum AoA, and with 2500lb fuel, the approach speed was around 154K.  The Minimum Fuel required on final landing was 2000lb. The F4’s big delta wing caused a ground ‘cushioning effect’ close to the ground so the pilot needed to apply a slight check-forward on the stick near the ground to get a positive touchdown, especially when the runway was wet.  The Drag-Chute was normally deployed on touchdown, but with the chute out the F4 tended ‘weather- cock’ in a cross wind (i.e. the tail was ‘pulled’ downwind by the chute and thus the nose tracked into wind to the upwind side of the runaway) so the pilot needed to jettison the chute when this happened. In normal conditions after landing the chute could be towed to the designated runway jettison point and dropped before taxying in. The F4 had a very big hook for arrested landings.
• Weapons Training at 31 TFW – at 31 TFW we trained to use the Aim 9 Sidewinder heat seeking missile, the Aim 7 Sparrow radar guided missile, the M61 20mm 6 barrel Gatling gun. Operationally, the F4 could deliver a wide variety of bombs and tactical Nukes and at HAFB we used the BDU 33 (low drag) and Mk 106 (high drag) practice bombs in place of the real bombs. 

• F4 Radar – The bigger radar of the F4D (it had bigger/wider nose for the wider radar dish) meant the F4D radar was supposed to have a longer air-to-air range and thus able to pick up smaller targets at a greater distance.   But the F4D radar was of older design and thus tended to be more prone to failure than the F4E.

• Cockpit Layout – The F4D and F4E cockpits were essentially of the same layout. However, the F4E had some better cockpit switch arrangements including a single switch on the outside of the left engine throttle in the front seat that was operated by the little (or ‘pinkie’) finger of the left hand – hence it being called the Pinkie Switch ! The Pinkie switch allowed the pilot to cycle between Radar (Aim 7 Sparrow missiles), Heat (Aim 9 Sidewinder missiles) and the gun. In the F4D there was no Pinkie switch so pilot had to reach down to the bottom of the instrument panel in the front cockpit to change the functions. The flight instrument layout in the rear cockpit was ‘pretty bad’ – gauges were set in a line across the panel, unlike to “Standard T” layout in the front set; and when the ILS was added to the aircraft, the little gauge was placed up beside the Standby Compass. Forward visibility from the back seat was at best ‘marginal’, especially when landing the aircraft when the nose was higher (rather like a Harvard!)– the rear seat RWR scope located high on the right hand side of the cockpit was often removed, especially in the TR phase when a trainee pilot was first learning to land the F4.   

• The Gatling Gun – Once it was properly harmonised, (i.e. having the gun pointing to where the gunsight indicated the bullets would go) the 20mm ‘nose gun’ in the F4E always seemed more accurate than the same type of gun that was carried in an underwing pod on the F4D and where harmonisation seemed to be a bit questionable. It was a GREAT gun!!

• All up, I liked the F4E better!

A selection of Incidents and my Cross Country Flights    

1 Sep 79 – Hurricane David evacuation. With Hurricane David closing in from the Caribbean towards coastal Florida, the 31 TFW and Air Force Reserve at HAFB needed to urgently evacuate some 125 F4s (four USAF Sqns of 25 each, plus one Air Force Reserve Sqn of 25 x F4Cs) from HAFB to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, before the hurricane hit the base. With four F4 aircraft in any one flight, and an Air Traffic Control requirement for there to be 10 minutes separation between each flight, it took over 5 hours to get all the flyable F4s away from HAFB. We returned to HAFB on 3^rd Sep 79 as David moved northwards and began to threaten Georgia and the Carolinas.